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Abstract: In this paper we outline the relevance of the New Institutional Economics
(NIE) approach in analysing the current behaviour of suppliers of agrocredit in
remote areas of developing economies. The paper covers the definition of NIE and
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INTRODUCTION
NIE began to develop as a self-conscious movement in 1970s following Coase’s
article on analysis of the firm in 1937 (Coase, 1937). Coase questions why firms
exist, a point of deviation from mainstream economics thinking which is perceived
as the starting point of NIE. Its best known representatives are Coase, Williamson
and North (Klein, 1999). According to Klein (1999), it is Williamson (1975) who
originated the term “New Institutional Economics”. North (1993) defines NIE as an
attempt to incorporate theory of institutions1 into economics by building on,
modifying and extending Neoclassical Economics (NCE) theory. NIE retains and
extends on the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition, which is
the basis for the choice theoretic approaches that, underlies microeconomics. In
explaining how NIE fits in NCE North, (1993) explains:
It (NIE) begins with the scarcity hence competition postulate; it views economics as
a theory of choice subject to constraints; it employs price theory as an essential part
of the analysis of institutions; and it sees changes in relative prices as a major force
inducing change in institutions.
What NIE abandons is the instrumental rationality in which NCE assumes existence
of the real world which in practice does not exist. NIE tries to modify the rationality
postulate and it adds institutions as a critical constraint and relating transaction costs
1 From NIE perspective, the term institutions refers to the rules of the game i.e. the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (such as policy,
rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed
codes of conduct), and their enforcement (http://coase.org/nieglossary.htm).
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to be connection between institutions and costs of production. In addition, NIE
incorporates ideas and ideologies into the analysis. NIE assumes that the real world
does not exist due to the fact that decision-makers have incomplete information and
limited capacity to process information leading to transaction costs which underlie
the formation of institutions thus, persistence of imperfect markets. NIE therefore
differs from mainstream NCE in insisting that policy analysis be guided by
comparative institutional analysis other than comparing real world outcomes with
the hypothetical benchmark of perfectly competitive general equilibrium (Klein,
1999). To summarise, NIE is a development of neo-classical economics to include
the role of transaction costs in exchange and so to take account of institutions as
critical constraints on economic performance.
BASIC FEATURES OF NIE
Conveniently the study of NIE has been revolving around four different but closely
linked strands, namely the institutional environment, institutional arrangement or
governance structures, moral hazard and agency theory, and transaction cost
economics. This section briefly reviews these approaches as described by various
NIE scholars.
The Institutional Environment
North (1993) defines institutional environment as set of background constraints, or
“rules of the game”, that guide individuals’ behaviour. These can be both formal,
explicit rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal, often implicit rules
(social conventions, norms, etc). While these background rules are the product of,
and thus can be explained in terms of, goals, beliefs and choices of individual
actors, the social result (the rule itself) is typically not known or designed by anyone
(Klein, 1999). Institutional environment forms the framework in which human
action takes place. According to North (1990:3) institutions reduce uncertainty by
providing a structure to everyday life. These institutions often arise spontaneously
as by-products of individual choices, rather than deliberately through collective
actions. Klein (1999) summarises types of these institutions (rules) into five main
categories: the legal environment and property rights, norms and social conventions,
economic history and economic growth, positive political theory, and complexity
and cognitive science. Formal institutions such as legal environment and property
rights governing economic activities may change more rapidly to respond to market
reforms than informal ones such as norms which at times may respond in a way that
is contrary to expectations under ideal conditions (Dorward et al, 1998).
The North’s idea on institutional environments and its interpretation by Dorward et
al, (1998) implies that in order for transaction to take place, partners in agrocredit
markets for example, have to incur costs of exchange in three broad areas of credit
contractual activity:
(a) Measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged. The exchange
partners are assumed to possess incomplete information concerning the
attributes of the good (credit contract) in question
(b) Protecting (and capturing) rights to the product being exchanged
(c) Policing and enforcing contractual agreements
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North’s perception that transaction costs are low within the community in a stylised
village in a developing country due to closeness of relationship is challenged by
Dorward et al, (1998). Dorward et al (opt cit) argue that for development to
proceed, people have to trade with others outside their village community, at
progressively longer distances away, thus transaction costs increases with
complexity and impersonality of trading contracts.
Institutional Arrangements and Theory of the Firm
Davis and North (1971) distinguish institutional arrangements from institutional
environment in that the former comprises of specific guidelines which are designed
by trading partners to mediate particular economic relationships. Business firms,
long term contracts, public bureaucracies, non-profit organisations and other
contractual arrangements are examples of institutional arrangements. Such
institutional arrangements are termed by Williamson (1996) as “institutions of
governance” or as “governance structures” (Williamson, 2000). These institutions
include contracts and organisations and in particular, the business firms. It is
arguably stated that the study of governance, in particular, the theory of the firm, is
more developed than the study of the institutional environment. Klein (1999) argues
that what economists usually mean by the “theory of the firm” is the theory of
production, not of the firm as a legal entity. NCE models the firm as a single actor
facing a series of straightforward decisions i.e. what level of output to produce, how
much of each factor of production to hire etc. Similarly Spulber, (1989) expresses
that the firm’s size and product range are usually explained by economists in terms
of production costs where, economies of scale implies larger firms, while
economies of scope justify the multiproduct firm. Klein (1999) argues that although
the conventional theory has proved highly useful for understanding pricing and
output decisions and how these vary with competitive conditions, the production
function approach provides little insights into the boundaries of the firm.
Unlike NCE’s failure to distinguish between the firm and the plant (production
process), NIE sees the firm as a set of arrangements (as an organisation) itself
worthy of economic analysis. In the Coasian (1937) framework from which other
NIE scholars have expanded, the decision to organise transactions within the firm as
opposed to the open market, “the make or buy decision,” depends on the relative
costs of internal and external exchange. The market mechanism entails certain costs
such as discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts etc.
Within the firm, the entrepreneur can reduce these transaction costs by coordinating
these activities himself. More generally, Williamson (2000) argues that since all
feasible modes of economic organisation incur costs, then the nature of the firm is
determinedly the relative costs of organising transactions under alternative
institutional arrangements.
Williamson (1995) adds the costs of adaptation onto the North’s (1990) costs of
contracting. The costs of adaptation are all costs incurred by contracting partners to
adjust to unforeseen changes in the original contracts between the partners.
Dorward et al., (1998) summarise these costs into three categories:
 Costs incurred when the terms of the contract turn out to be sub-optimal under
the circumstances actually experienced,
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 Ccosts of negotiation for better terms with the other party to the contract, and
 Costs of seeking arbitration or of going to court in case of disputes.
Based on Williamson’s view, Dorward et al., (1998), further identify three key
characteristics of transactions and discuss them in the context of their applicability
in agricultural markets in developing countries:
 The degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction. Agricultural production
is inherently risky and uncertain due to factors such as climatic variability, and
crop marketing faces uncertainty due to price fluctuations. These factors define
the nature of contractual transaction that takes place.
 The frequency of the transaction.  Agricultural transactions tend to be highly
seasonal. They argue that transaction cost increases with large infrequent
transactions but decrease with many small transactions between parties since
the latter allow them to build up information about each other.
 The extent to which one or both parties are involved in investing in specific
assets. Asset specificity involves assets that are human or physical for which
the investment cannot be recovered in a use other than that originally planned
for. Dorward et al., (opt. cit) give an example of the farmers’ co-operative
demands for a high price for its products from the processor, knowing that the
processor’s equipment would be idle without the products (opportunism). NCE
perception is that asset specificity does not exist since resources (e.g. labour and
capital) can costless be switched to alternative activity if the former activity is
idle or not profitable.
Moral Hazard and Agency Theory
Moral hazard and the agency theory constitute one of the approaches of the modern
theory of the firm, whereby ownership and control of the large firms are separated.
The interests of the salaried managers of the modern corporation may differ from
those of the owners (shareholders). In this case managers may use their discretion to
“shirk” or otherwise pursue their own objectives (e.g. firm growth, personal power,
entrenchment) at the expense of shareholders. Klein (1999) argues that the basic
model of conflict between shareholders and managers i.e. the principal-agent
problem, remains a powerful lens for viewing the internal organisation of the firm.
The agency theory studies the degree of ex ante incentive-compatible mechanisms
to reduce agency costs in the face of potential moral hazard by agents. Klein
summarises the agency costs as the sum of:
 Monitoring expenditures of the principal
 The bonding expenditures by the agent and
 The residual loss i.e. the potential gains from trade not realised because
principals cannot provide perfect incentives for agents when the agents’ actions
are unobservable.
In a typical agency model, a principal assigns an agent to do some task (e.g.
producing output) but has only an imperfect signal of the agent’s performance (e.g.
personal effort). Thus, a firm is defined by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) as simply a
convenient label for the collection of contracts between owners and managers,
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managers and employees and the firm and its customers and suppliers. The agency
theory has remained popular in imperfect market information related studies and it
is widely applied in business and marketing management studies.
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE)
TCE represents an alternative approach to studying institutional arrangements. It
holds that all but the simplest transactions require some kind of mechanism to
protect the transacting parties from various hazards associated with exchange. This
mechanism is what Williamson (1995, 2000) refers to as the governance structure.
The appropriate governance structure depends on the characteristics of the
transaction, thus TCE implies an applied research programme of comparative
contractual analysis i.e. how different forms of governance work in various
circumstances. For this reason, TCE (associated with Williamson) is sometimes
described as the “governance” branch of NIE, as opposed to the “measurement”
branch (associated with Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). TCE is the most widely used
approach in NIE related researches and in fact, as also pointed out strongly by
Hubbard (1997), TCE stands at the heart of NIE.
The governance approach is distinguished by its emphasis on incomplete contracts.
With orthodox economic model of competitive general equilibrium, all contracts are
assumed to be complete. TCE relaxes this assumption and holds that in the
transaction cost framework, economic organisation imposes costs because complex
contracts are unavoidably incomplete.  The contractual incompleteness exposes the
contracting parties to certain risks. The need to adapt to unforeseen contingencies is
an additional cost of contracting, failure to adapt leads to the so-called
maladaptation costs especially for specific assets investments.TCE holds that
parties tend to choose the governance structure that best controls the
underinvestment problem (unwillingness to invest in specific assets without
protection for contingencies), given the particulars of the relationship. More
generally, contractual difficulties can arise from several sources (Klein, 1999) i.e.
bilateral dependency, weak property rights, measurement difficulties and/or over
searching, inter-temporal issues that can take form of disequilibrium contracting,
real-time responsiveness, long latency and strategic abuse, and weaknesses in
institutional environment. Each of these has the potential to impose maladaptation
costs. Foreseeing this possibility, agents seek to reduce the potential costs of
maladaptation by matching the appropriate governance structure with the particular
characteristics of the transaction. Thus, the main hypothesis of the TCE is that
economic organisation is mainly an effort to align transactions, which differ in their
attributes, with the governance structures, which differ in their costs and
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economising) way
(Williamson 1975; Menard 1997; Williamson 2001). The role of TCE is therefore to
give explanation of how trading partners choose, from the set of feasible
institutional alternatives, the arrangement that protects their relationship-specific
investments at the possible least cost (Klein, 1999, p.468). The rest of this paper
concentrates on how TCE has been useful in analysing economic organisations in




Transaction costs, as put forward by Coase (1937, 1960, 1984, 1992) refers to the
costs of using the price mechanism or the cost of carrying out a transaction by
means of an exchange on the open market. In empirical studies, a direct
measurement of transaction costs is simply the economic value of resources used in
locating trading partners and executing transactions (Wallis and North, 1986; de
Soto, 1989; Wang, 2003). Wang (2003) summarises a survey of research
programmes that have contributed to our understanding of transaction costs which
could be subdivided into two major categories: the marketed and non marketed
transaction costs.
Marketed Transaction Costs
Measurement of the marketed transaction costs is based on the Williamsonian view
of transaction costs (Williamson 1975, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001). The distinctive
feature of the marketed transaction costs is the cost of conducting transactions in
one organisational or contractual form relative to the others. Therefore what matters
is not the absolute amount of transaction costs, but the relative ranking of
transaction costs associated with different organisational and contractual choices.
Furthermore, Wang (2003) observes that in empirical studies, transaction costs are
not directly measured. Thus instead certain proxy variables which are believed to
critically affect the costs of transactions are used. Such proxies include uncertainty,
transaction frequency, asset specificity, opportunism etc. A statistically significant
relationship between the chosen proxy and organisational governance suffices to
make a justification that various contractual arrangements within a given market are
set to economise on transaction costs.
Klein (1999) observes that much of the empirical research in TCE is based on the
same basic model: the efficient form of economic organisation and therefore the
likelihood of observing a particular organisation form or governance structure is a
function of certain properties of the underlying transactions such as asset
specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency. Organisational form is the
dependent variable, while asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency
of transactions are independent variables. Specifically, the probability of observing
a more integrated organisational structure depends positively on the amount or
value of the relationship-specific assets involved. The significant levels of asset
specificity depend on the degree of uncertainty about the future of the relationship,
on the complexity of the transaction and on the frequency of transactions. Based on
Williamsonian view, Klein (1999) argues that most empirical literature inspired by
TCE takes as given an economising framework, assuming that we can draw
inferences about the efficiency of organisational forms by observing what
organisations are actually doing. Unlike earlier traditions in industrial organisation
which presumed that complex contracts and similar deviations from perfect
competition are usually attempts to gain monopoly power, Williamson (1985)
argues that TCE follows the common law presumption that such contracts serve
affirmative economic gains. Furthermore Coase (1964) reported in Klein (1999)
contends that such contracts are objectively relevant unless some feasible
alternative exists.
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Following Williamsonian approach, organisational form is modelled as a binary
variable – e.g. “make or buy” although it can sometimes be represented by a
continuous variable. Of the independent variables mentioned earlier in this section,
asset specificity is the most difficult to measure. Williamson (1991) distinguishes
six different types of asset specificity
 Site specificity – this is where parties are in what is referred to as a “cheek-by-
jowl” relationship to reduce transportation and inventory costs, and assets are
immobile
 Physical asset specificity – this refers to relationship-specific equipment and
machinery
 Human asset specificity – this describes transaction-specific knowledge or
human capital, achieved through specialised training or learning-by-doing
 Brand name-capital specificity –This is reflected in intangible assets reflected in
consumer perceptions
 Dedicated asset specificity – This refers to substantial, general purpose
investments that would not have been made outside a particular transaction, the
commitment of which is necessary to serve a large customer
 Temporal assets specificity – this describes assets which must be used in a
particular sequence in a given transaction.
Various common empirical proxies have been used to quantify certain forms of
asset specificity. For example Masten (1984) uses component complexity,
qualitatively coded from survey data as a proxy for physical asset specificity.
Another proxy for physical asset specificity has been research and development
expenditure.  Monteverde and Teece (1982) use worker specific knowledge, coded
from survey data to quantify human asset specificity.  Physical proximity of
contracting firms has also been used as a proxy for site specificity (Spiller, 1985;
Joskow, 1988, 1991). Other proxies, such as fixed costs or capital intensity, have
more obvious limitations and are therefore rarely used (Klein, 1999).
Non-Marketed Transaction Costs
Unlike marketed transaction costs, non-market transaction costs are those costs that
do not flow through the market. For instance resources spent in waiting, getting
licences to do business, cutting through the red tapes, bribing officials etc. Non-
marketed transaction cost is critically important in understanding the economies
particularly in developing countries such as Tanzania where such costs are rampant.
Non-marketed transaction costs affect not only the contractual arrangement of
production, but also the amount and type of goods and services to be produced and
available on the market (North, 1990; de Soto, 1989). Literature in non-marketed
transaction costs emphasises the cost of setting up a business i.e. the cost of entry.
This differs from barriers of entry as traditionally emphasised in the mainstream
economics literature such as monopoly, large initial capital investment etc (Wang,
2003). Instead, the emphasis is on government imposed cumbersome rules and
regulations, such as import regulations, rules on sale or lease of real estate, export
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and import regulations, taxes, licensing procedures etc.  These costs force
entrepreneurs to conduct some or all of their business outside the official economy
or even worse, discourage them from entry all together (see for example Johnson et
al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2002; and Hoshi et al., 2002).
Various research work has been done to measure the non-marketed transaction costs
(e.g. de Sotto, 1989); Benham and Benham, 1997, 1998, 2001; Gabre-Madhin,
2001; Djankov et al, 2002).  In his study, de Soto documents the costs of doing
business formally i.e. the costs of meeting legal requirements for starting and
running a business, and the costs of doing business informally (where such costs are
not incurred) in Peru.  Benham and Benham (1998) carry out the comparative
studies across countries to measure the cost of exchange. They argue that the cost of
doing business varies across individuals and countries since the principle of NCE’s
single price usually does not apply due to taxes, tariffs and knowledge base.
Quoting figures from The Services Corporation (1998), Benham and Benham
(2001) found that it took 7-14 days with waiting time of up to 91 days in Tanzania
to clear items already in port whereas in Singapore it took only 15 minutes. The
fourteen days wait in Tanzania is more than 1300 times the average waiting time in
Singapore.  In her study of Ethiopian grain market, Gabre-Madhin (2001) measures
the cost of transactions that grain traders do face. For each transaction she measures
the labour time in searching trading partners and the opportunity cost of working
capital during search. The latter is the measure of how costly it is for a trader to tie
up working capital in grain stocks while waiting for a transaction to take place.
APPROACHES TO TRANSACTION COST MEASUREMENT
Methodological debates in ways of applying transaction cost approach are
summarised in Chang and Ive (2000). The authors discuss the theoretical and
empirical differences between two dominant approaches to measuring transaction
costs for a given transaction type (e.g. farm credit supply) i.e. the Direct
Measurement Approach (DMA) and Indirect Measurement Approach (IMA).
DMA is an approach that considers direct measurement of the magnitude of
transaction costs of running a governance structure whereas IMA is concerned with
the determination of the factors that are predicted to be responsible for comparative
difference in transaction costs across governance structures. For a rational, sound
model based on transaction costs entails showing clear link between costs of
organisation and of selecting governance structure.  Intuitively, a good reason for
explaining why governance structure 1 (GS1) is chosen instead of governance
structure 2 (GS2) is justified by the lower costs of using GS1.
The major difference between DMA and IMA is the depth and type of data
required. For DMA data is required on measurable transaction attributes, the
relative sums of all transaction costs for transactions with similar attributes under
different governance structures, and the absolute values of the comparatively
significant elements of total transaction costs. For IMA data is required on
measurable transaction attributes and on relative frequencies with which governance
structures are used, for transactions with different attributes. According to DMA, all
n categories of transaction costs iTC (i=1...n) associated with use of a given
governance structure must first be identified before being quantified. Summing up
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all the quantified items of transaction costs gives the total cost of running a given





 iTC is regarded as most efficient. This implies that in using DMA,
the absolute level of elements of transaction costs, and the relative or ordinal level
of total transaction costs must be known in order to determine the relative efficiency
of governance structures. Since there are several elements of transaction cost whose
relative magnitude or weight are not known in advance, this poses a limitation to the
application of DMA. In order to overcome the difficulties in measuring the absolute
level of transaction costs inherent in DMA, the IMA stresses comparative
differences between transaction costs of comparable governance structures.
Provided there are say two governance structures under review, their running costs
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3where kX is the matrix of k transaction cost attributes and l is the total number
of transaction cost attributes. Figure 1 summarises the procedures for implementing
DMA and IMA. The common point of departure between the two approaches is the
step of identifying attributes (categories) of transaction costs that may occur in the
course of transactions. After identifying the sources of transaction costs and
interpreting why they will change with different governance structures, leading to
predicted frequency dominance of one governance structure (GS) over another, the
two approaches branch out at this point. If DMA is adopted, transaction costs have
to be broken down into a comprehensive significance list of elements for which no
adequate a priori reasons to reject in advance the proposition that they may vary
significantly between one GS and another (i.e. reasons to rule out their comparative
significance). If the IMA is adopted, it requires theoretical prediction of transaction
cost attributes that are perceived to influence differences in performance of
governance structures.  From the direction of attributes acting on the selection of
GSs, given the assumption that behaviour is transaction cost minimising, the
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theoretical prediction of effect of attributes on difference in TCs between one GS
and another can be indirectly identified.
Figure 2: DMA and IMA implementation flow chart
DMA IMA
DMA
Source: Adapted from Chang and Ive (2000)
Regarding measurability of transaction cost elements, there is no way out of context
to make a judgement about which approach is better. Modelling transaction cost as
a tax (thus included in the profit maximisation equation) is a sensible way only to
simplify the problem for dealing with parametric uncertainty. This is also where the
DMA is relatively more feasible in that the costs in proportion to the number or
volume of transactions can easily be estimated reliably (See for example Gabre-
Madhin, 2003; Makhura, 2001 for the application of DMA). In contrast, if the main
source of transaction costs stem from behavioural uncertainty (as it is with the
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(a) Costs of information collection measurement
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(c) Commitment costs (asset specificity)
(d) Costs of opportunism (screening partners)
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Observe actual frequency
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testing whether frequency
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current study), the potential costs incurred will go beyond resource-incurring
transaction costs and include commitment, rent seeking and opportunism costs.
Chang and Ive (2000) conclude that the relative desirability of the DMA and IMA is
naturally dependent on what are the principle elements of transaction costs with
comparative significance, which in turn is affected by what are the alternative GSs
under comparison. The conceptual framework discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.5,
provides an understanding of the main sources of transaction costs that may occur in
the agrocredit supply chain and hence justification for the application of IMA in the
current study.
APPLICATION OF TCE IN AGRICULTURE
Irrespective of its importance in analysing agriculture sector development, very few
agricultural economists especially in developing countries have used TCE approach
to address agricultural development paths. Hubbard (1997) agrees with this point
when he notes that:“…Agricultural economics has been less guilty of this omission
than other branches of microeconomics, despite having long incorporated risk and
uncertainty of yield and income.”
The comprehensive reviews of the empirical TCE research by Boerner and Macher
(2001) and Wang (2003) reveal that there has been little systematic statistical
analysis of agriculture or the organisation of agriculture transaction from a
transaction cost perspective. However Masten (2000) notes that agricultural
transactions provide a rich and largely unexplored area for application and
refinement of transaction cost theory.  Masten further argues that agricultural
transactions display a broad range of governance structures, including the location-
specific nature of the investments required and the temporal specifications
associated with the perishability of the agricultural products. Boerner and Macher
(2001) point out that the nature of agricultural products and production means
physical and human asset specificities likely play a less important role in
agricultural transactions in comparison to the temporal and vocational specificities
associated with production, processing and distribution of farm produce.
Perishability (which affects quality) of farm produce tends to exacerbate contracting
hazards between contracting parties, while geographic and process disparities
between contracting parties tend to impede the administration and coordination of
activities. Based on this premise, Knoeber (1983) examined the governance of fruits
and vegetable processing and dairy processing and found that there was a
significant connection between hold-up problems, and temporal and location
specificities.
Another body of literature on the empirical studies of TCE in agriculture is
connected to the examination of the extent and use of long term contracting in
agriculture. Purceli (1990) examines the growth of long term contracting and
prevalence of integration between feedlots and beef processors brought on by the
site specificity that exists. Allen and Lueck (1992, 1996) study the use of relatively
simple short term contracts in farming, and argue that the simplicity of these
agreements reflects the comparative advantage of enforcing farmland contracts
through the market and common law. The authors suggest that the character of the
farming economy, namely good information about reputations, the immobility of
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farmers and land owners, relatively low transaction costs and the desire to maintain
long term relationships, lends itself to the pervasive use of informal, simple
contracting.
In their study on the institutional adjustments to coffee trade liberalisation in
Tanzania, Anna Temu and Nelson (2001) apply TCE theory to empirically examine
the impact of liberalised market on transaction costs. The authors argue that
although liberalisation has reduced costs in output market, it has however removed
opportunities for linked input-output transactions that served to lower the costs of
providing finance in state controlled parastatals. They found that irrespective of the
fact that output marketing costs2 have fallen with general positive impacts on
smallholder coffee farmers, there has been a massive rise of transaction costs for
rural finance. They further argue that evaluation of trade liberalisation that focuses
on output market alone ignores the rising transaction costs in financing necessary
productive inputs particularly to small-scale farmers. Anna Temu and Nelson
(op.cit) reveal that since 1994 economic agents (private traders, co-operative
unions, and the government) have responded to liberalised coffee market in
Tanzania by forming new contracts (governance structures) to reduce costs in the
new institutional environment. These contracts ranged from vertical integration of
exporters into assembly and processing, to collaborative support for National Input
Voucher Scheme (NIVS) involving all stakeholders (the state, private traders and
cooperative unions). The impact of these arrangements has been detrimental to
financing production. Fewer farmers have been able to access input finance. The
study by Anna Temu and Nelson reveals further that while all coffee farmers
received input finance before liberalisation, 80% of interviewed smallholder coffee
farmers did not receive input finance after liberalisation of coffee market, and that
of the remaining 20% claimed to have had access to finance through shopkeepers
(8%), cooperative societies (8%) and through official projects (4%). This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that no large scale input financing system has been in place,
as a result the multiple outlets for coffee have resulted to increased transaction costs
of screening, monitoring and enforcing input financing transactions. Similar
observations could be probable for other tradable farm products in the country.
Applying NIE approach, Fafchamps (2004) gives a bird’s eye view of the practical
functioning of market institutions in Sub Saharan Africa. Fafchamps used survey
questionnaires to collect cross sectional data from traders who locally marketed
consumed staples in Benin, Madagascar and Malawi.  The type of data collected
included search behaviour and costs, quality inspection, contract enforcement,
information, and property rights enforcement. Fafchamps used a cross section of
variables to assess factors responsible for trading partners to abide by or breach the
2 In their paper Anna Temu and Nelson (2001) define marketing costs as the combined transaction and
transformation costs of marketing. Transformation costs refer to costs of physically transforming
products through space, form and time (e.g. transportation, processing and storage) whereas
transaction costs refer to the costs of arranging an exchange that do not relate to physical treatment of
the commodity. However, as with other studies on TCE, the paper by Anna Temu and Nelson did not
explicitly quantify the transaction costs and show their proportion in the marketing costs used to
compute marketing margins.
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contractual arrangements. He categorised these variables into subgroups such as
incidence of theft and breach of contract, exposure to theft and prevention, variation
of quality and inspection by trader, assessment of type and quality, risk exposure
and incidence etc. Using descriptive statistics and logistic regression analysis
Fafchamps shows that theft and breach of contract is low among agricultural traders
and that losses resulting from such are small, suggesting that such market
institutions in SSA work well. Further econometric analyses showed that exposure
to risk such as overnight storage is a significant risk factor. Other significant theft
risks were found to be risk of ambush and employee-related theft. Therefore traders
avoid exposure to risk and breach of contract by sleeping in their stores, payment of
protection money and travel in convoys, refraining from hiring additional workers,
and adopting commercial practices that leave little room for abuse of contract.
Among the common commercial practices include cash and carry transactions,
infrequent supplier credit, uncommon placement of orders, and virtual absence of
payment by check or invoicing. Using case study surveys in Kenya and Ghana,
Fafchamps (2004) documents how trust and business relationships arise and their
role in the conduct of business with a focus among others, on screening procedures
for supplier credit and the role of social (network) capital in business performance.
Traders value relationships (social networks) because they open access to trade
credit in the form of payment facilities with suppliers or advances paid by
customers.  Fafchamps (op.cit, p. 194) found that transacting parties never grant or
receive trade credit on the first transaction, indicating the role of relationships
(social network) in access to trade credit. Although Fafchamps (2004) did not
quantify the transaction costs associated with comparable forms of trade
arrangements, much of his theoretical and analytical insights are useful in assessing
and quantifying transaction costs that are associated with contractual arrangements
in other markets such as agrocredit markets. Fafchamps provides methodological
approach on data collection (questionnaire designing) and data analysis (descriptive
statistics, and econometric modelling and testing of primary data) that are
particularly relevant to the economic analysis of development.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN TCE
Empirical research in TCE employs a variety of econometric and historical
methods. The term “empirical” is defined by Shelanski and Klein (1995) and
Boerner and Macher (2001) as to include qualitative case studies, quantitative single
industry studies, and cross sectional econometric analyses. Many scholars (for
example Masten and Saussier, 2000; Boerner and Macher, op.cit; and Kydd, pers.
Comm. 2006) argue that although case studies are often criticised because of their
lack of generality and possible ex post rationalisation, they are an important and
necessary complement to econometric analyses. In addition, case studies often
provide a richer description and perspective than many statistical analyses offer.
Boerner and Macher (2001) refer single industry studies as to mean quantitative
case studies or research that quantitatively examines contracting in a single industry
(See for example analysis of farming by Allen and Lueck, 1998). Other studies such
as the Maher’s (1997) examination of contractual relations between customers and
suppliers examine contracts across industries more than one. The bulk of the
empirical research in TCE falls into the first three categories i.e. qualitative case
studies, quantitative single industry studies, and cross sectional econometric
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analyses. TCE researchers are increasingly implementing more novel
methodological approaches than discrete choice analysis to evaluate the influence of
transactional properties, hold-up or small numbers bargaining on the mode of
governance and over time3. The review paper by Boerner and Macher (2001) on the
assessment of empirical TCE research reveals that the most common means of
primary data collection in empirical TCE research are mail surveys, interviews and
firm visits. Researchers often use Likert scale, whereby survey participants do rate
transactional considerations, such as the degree to which an investment is specific to
the relationship or to the level of demand or supply uncertainty present in the
industry. Authors caution that although these data are most popular, they are subject
to the general limitations of survey data that they are based on respondents’ stated
beliefs rather than non-subjective valuations.
The second type of data collection by other researchers (e.g. Balakrishnan and
Wernerfelt, 1986) involves continuous measures of transactional considerations,
although limitations do exist. It is unlikely that continuous measures, such as
research and development intensity or advertising intensity, can distinguish specific
investments from durable or generic investments, or can differentiate contractual
hazards from firm specific capabilities, especially across industries (Henisz, 2000).
The third method of data collection is secondary data collection. Although surveys
are the principle and preferred data collection approach, a number of empirical
studies utilise secondary data collection techniques. These techniques include
published data from diverse sources such as industry trade publications, government
data, newspapers or archival data. In comparison to survey or questionnaire data,
secondary data may offer shorter collection times and larger sample sizes. Other
secondary data outside of published data are contracts between exchange partners.
Usually employed by economists, the examination of actual contracts represents an
excellent data source for historic and empirical TCE related research. Boerner and
Macher (2001) report that TCE research using contract data is diverse and examines
the decision to contract (Lyons 1995), to contract duration and to contract design
(Joskow 1988). The fourth approach of data collection, which is most recent but not
as popular as the previous ones is the approach that employs experimental methods.
Individuals are separated into control groups and manipulated groups and the
impact of the manipulated factors (in this case transactional measures typically
under a role-playing scenario), on perceived transaction costs are examined.
CONCLUSION
In economically isolated areas, the provision of agrocredit is likely to be a
government’s task in the short term but with a gradual withdraw in the long term,
only so when more private suppliers are motivated to engage in the business on a
sustainable manner. Thus the government needs not only to formulate pro-
agrocredit market policies, but also to fully participate in the delivery of agrocredit
when needed. This is due to the fact that such areas have very low potential to
attract private investors because of prevailing transaction costs resulting from such
factors like the areas’ remoteness and covariant risk which raise up the transaction
risks for potential agrocredit suppliers.  The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
3 For more literature on the novel methodological approaches refer to Boerner and Macher (2001)
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theory was the core theoretical basis for this study. However, some of the
assumptions of TCE theory need some adjustments to suit the third world,
particularly in most isolated areas of the developing world.  For instance, Ngaruko
(2008) found out that the specificity of assets was not as stipulated in the theory
especially in rural areas. For example he found out that being a rural dweller was
sufficient to be location specific to farming business; that irrespective of declining
marginal productivity of agricultural sector rural dwellers kept on engaging
themselves in farming business. This implies that if rural dwellers did not practice
farming then their labour could not be used elsewhere due to limited non-farm
investments in rural areas. The application of NIE theory in advancing
understanding of the development path of agrocredit market and other related
markets has proved very relevant particularly in less developed areas of the
developing world.
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